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Abstract
Wrongful convictions and miscarriages of justice, their
reasons and effects, only rarely become the subject of aca-
demic debate in Poland. This article aims at filling this gap
and providing a discussion on the current challenges of
mechanisms available in Polish law focused on the verifica-
tion of final judgments based on innocence claims. While
there are two procedures designed to move such judgment:
cassation and the reopening of criminal proceedings, only
the latter aims at the verification of new facts and evidence,
and this work remains focused exactly on that issue. The
article begins with a case study of the famous Komenda
case, which resulted in a successful innocence claim, serving
as a good, though rare, example of reopening a case and
acquitting the convict immediately and allows for discussing
the reasons that commonly stand behind wrongful convic-
tions in Poland. Furthermore, the article examines the inno-
cence claim grounds as regulated in the Polish criminal
procedure and their interpretation under the current case
law. It also presents the procedure concerning the revision
of the case. The work additionally provides the analysis of
the use of innocence claim in practice, feeding on the statis-
tical data and explaining tendencies in application for revi-
sion of a case. It also presents the efforts of the Polish
Ombudsman and NGOs to raise public awareness in that
field. The final conclusions address the main challenges that
the Polish system faces concerning innocence claims and
indicates the direction in which the system should go.
Keywords: wrongful convictions, right to claim innocence,
reopening of criminal proceedings, miscarriage of justice,
revision of final judgment
1 Introduction
Wrongful convictions, miscarriages of justice and the
right of the convict to claim innocence are not necessar-
ily topics that claim the attention of Polish scholars. The
legal literature, engaged in the discussion on a variety of
appellate measures available during criminal proceed-
ings, devotes surprisingly little attention to the measures
allowing for reopening cases closed with a final judg-
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ment, leaving it on the fringes of interest for Polish aca-
demics. Only occasionally do miscarriages of justice,
their reasons and effects, attract academic debate.1 The
issue of the compensation for wrongful conviction
attracts more attention.2 However, the studies rarely
involve analysis of quantitative and qualitative data con-
cerning wrongful convictions and their reasons.3 Alto-
gether, the research relating to this issue is not even
comparable to that carried out on that topic, especially
in the US, but also in Europe.4 This seems intriguing.
Miscarriages of justice affect their victims in various
ways. They range from physical and psychological to
social and financial harm of the persons directly or indi-
rectly affected by wrongful conviction.5 But they also
impact the whole society since convicting the innocent
means that criminal justice system failed to protect the
victims of crime. Erring in doing justice undermines the
public trust in the criminal justice system and in the
rule of law.6 The miscarriages of justice may also gener-
1. Ł. Chojniak, Niesłuszne skazania – przyczyny i skutki (2016); Ł. Choj-
niak and Ł. Wiśniewski, Przyczyny niesłusznych skazań w Polsce
(2012); A. Sowa, ‘Przyczyny pomyłek sądowych’, 1-2 Palestra 138
(2002). See also in English A. Górski and M. Ejchart, ‘Wrongful Convic-
tions in Poland’, 80 University of Cincinnati Law Review 1079 (2012).
2. See e.g. P. Cioch, Odpowiedzialność Skarbu Państwa z tytułu niesłusz-
nego skazania (2007), Ł. Chojniak, Odszkodowanie za niesłuszne ska-
zanie, tymczasowe aresztowanie oraz niesłuszne oskarżenie (2013); K.
Dudka and B. Dobosiewicz, Odszkodowanie za niesłuszne skazanie,
tymczasowe aresztowanie lub zatrzymanie w praktyce orzeczniczej
sądów powszechnych (2012); W. Jasiński, ‘Odszkodowanie i
zadośćuczynienie za niesłuszne skazanie, wykonanie środka zabezpiec-
zającego oraz niezasadne stosowanie środków przymusu po nowelizacji
kodeksu postępowania karnego’, 9 Prokuratura i Prawo 49 (2015), See
also in English: K. Wiśniewska, ‘Liability of State Treasury for Judicial
Errors – Polish Experiences and Legal Solutions’, 7 Czasopismo Prawa
Karnego i Nauk Penalnych 1 (2019), www.czpk.pl/artykuly/liability-of-
state-treasury-for-judicial-errors-polish-experiences-and-legal-solutions
(last visited 1 August 2020).
3. Chojniak and Wiśniewski, above n. 1; J. Widacki and A. Dudzińska,
‘Pomyłki sądowe. Skazania osób niewinnych w Polsce’, 11-12 Palestra
64 (2007); Sowa, above n. 2; O. Mazur, ‘Niesłuszne skazania w Polsce
w opinii prokuratorów i policjantów’, 3-4 Palestra 23 (2002).
4. See e.g. C. Hoyle and M. Sato, Reasons to Doubt. Wrongful Convic-
tions and the Criminal Cases Review Commission (2019); B. Forst,
Errors of Justice: Nature, Sources and Remedies (2004); C.R. Huff and
M. Killias (eds.), Wrongful Convictions and Miscarriages of Justice:
Causes and Remedies in North American and European Criminal Jus-
tice Systems (2013); C.R. Huff and M. Killias (eds.), Wrongful Convic-
tion: International Perspectives on Miscarriages of Justice (2010); M.
Naughton, The Innocent and the Criminal Justice System: A Sociologi-
cal Analysis of Miscarriages of Justice (2013); M. Naughton, Rethink-
ing Miscarriages of Justice: Beyond the Tip of the Iceberg (2007); R.
Nobles and D. Schiff, Understanding Miscarriages of Justice (2002); R.
Nobles, D. Schiff & G. Teubner, Understanding Miscarriages of Justice:
Law, the Media and the Inevitability of a Crisis (2000).
5. Naughton (2013), above n. 4, at 165-78.
6. S. Poyser, A. Nurse & R. Milne, Miscarriages of Justice. Causes, Conse-
quences and Remedies (2018), at 128.
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ate substantial financial costs that should not be easily
bypassed.7
It is hard to judge what reasons lie behind that relative
lack of interest of Polish scholars in wrongful convic-
tions. It is definitely not because the criminal justice
system is perceived as not producing such cases. There
are a host of studies showing how shortcomings in
investigation, bias, false testimonies other factors pro-
duce false convictions.8 The belief that the public trial is
able to counterbalance those risks or that criminal jus-
tice system is immune to them has been widely contes-
ted. The criticism concerning the shortcomings of the
criminal justice system that may result in wrongful con-
victions is continuously expressed by practitioners and
academia. Yet it may be that the scale of that phenom-
enon is not perceived as large enough to launch an aca-
demic discussion on a wide scale. Another reason might
be that Poland had long been waiting for a case that
would trigger a nationwide public debate and engage the
media. This happened with the widely covered Komen-
da case, which shocked the public and opened a discus-
sion on the reasons for wrongful convictions, the ways
in which the wrongfully convicted should be reim-
bursed for their time in isolation, and the legal measures
available to re-verify the final cases.
The Polish Code of Criminal Procedure9 provides for
many options to question the final judgment. A long-
standing Polish tradition is a two-fold system of proce-
dures designed to verify final court judgments: the cas-
sation and the reopening of criminal proceedings. The
former mechanism is designed to correct judicial deci-
sions tainted by legal defects that occurred in the course
of the proceedings (violations of either substantive or
procedural law provisions). The cassation in its contem-
porary shape10 empowers the Supreme Court to quash a
final judgment if it has been proven that it was tainted
by serious violations of law that occurred in the course
of criminal proceedings. The power to lodge the cassa-
tion is vested with the parties, as well as with the Prose-
cutor General, the Ombudsman and the Child’s
Ombudsman.
The second procedure allowing the reversal of the final
judgment has a slightly different character. The reopen-
ing of judicial proceedings happens primarily when new
facts or evidence has been discovered after the final
judgment has been passed that indicate that the convic-
ted person was innocent or convicted on the basis of a
provision carrying an inadequately severe penalty (prop-
7. Naughton (2013), above n. 4, at 173-8.
8. See i.a. publications mentioned in n. 5.
9. Code of Criminal Procedure (Kodeks postępowania karnego) of
6 June 1997, Dz.U. 1997, Nr 89, poz. 555 with amendments [herein-
after CCP].
10. Note that during the communist period and a few years after democrat-
ic transition (1950-1995) the Polish criminal procedure in place of cas-
sation provided for a distinct model of extraordinary revision of judg-
ments, depriving the parties of the right to question the judgment and
entrusting that right only to the Prosecutor General, the Minister of Jus-
tice, the First President of the Supreme Court and the Ombudsman
(after its creation in 1988).
ter nova grounds).11 Proceedings may also be reopened if
an offence has been committed in connection with the
closed proceedings and there are reasonable grounds to
believe that this might have affected the ruling in ques-
tion (propter falsa grounds).12 These two grounds are
seamlessly present in Polish criminal procedure since
the enforcement of the first procedural regulations after
Poland regained independence in 1918.13
But during the twentieth century, additional grounds
for reopening of the proceedings were added. Currently,
the reopening is possible as a result of the judgment of
the Constitutional Court14 or international tribunal15
establishing a violation of the Constitution or inter-
national treaty that occurred in the course of the rele-
vant proceedings.16 It is also possible in cases where
conviction has been passed in absentia without notifi-
cation of the defendant about the date of hearing,17
when a convicted defendant, whose penalty was extraor-
dinarily mitigated in return for his or her cooperation
with law enforcement authorities, did not confirm the
disclosed information in investigation during the trial,18
and as a result of establishment of serious procedural
errors that took place in the course of proceedings.19
Most recently, upon the adoption of the new law on the
Supreme Court at the end of 2017,20 the third extraordi-
nary measure has been introduced to the Polish legal
system. In the course of efforts to subordinate the judi-
ciary to the executive, undertaken by the Law and Jus-
tice party (Prawo i Sprawiedliwość), the so-called extra-
ordinary complaint (skarga nadzwyczajna) was intro-
duced. The new procedure provides that if it is necessa-
ry to ensure compliance with the principle of a demo-
cratic state implementing the rules of social justice, an
extraordinary complaint may be lodged against a final
judgment of a common court or a military court, pro-
vided that the judgment violates the principles or free-
doms and human and citizen rights set out in the Con-
stitution, or the judgment grossly violates the law owing
to its incorrect interpretation or application, or there is
11. Art. 540 § 1 (2) CCP.
12. Art. 540 § 1 (1) CCP.
13. See more on the history of Polish criminal procedure in W. Jasiński and
K. Kremens, Criminal Law in Poland (2019), at 42-9.
14. After the establishment of the Polish Constitutional Court in 1985.
15. This, in particular, concerns the European Court of Human Rights judg-
ments since, in 1993, Poland became a party to the European Conven-
tion on Human Rights.
16. Arts. 540 § 2 and 3 CCP.
17. Art. 540b § 1 CCP.
18. Art. 540a CCP.
19. Art. 542 § 3 CCP. This mode for reopening of criminal proceedings is
possible ex officio. It replaced previously existing procedure to nullify
the judgment which was removed from the Polish CCP in 2003.
20. Act of 8 December 2017 on Supreme Court (Dz.U. 2018, poz. 5 with
amendments). It is the same act that lowered the age of judges’ retire-
ment and interrupted the term of office of the First President of the
Supreme Court, which were qualified as a violation of Art. 19(1) TEU by
the CJEU (judgment of 24 June 2019, ECLI:EU:C:2019:531). See more:
‘Attack on Judiciary in Poland Was Planned and Successful. Stefan Bato-
ry Foundation Legal Expert Group Reports’, https://
archiwumosiatynskiego.pl/wpis-w-debacie-en/attack-judiciary-in-
poland-planned-and-successful-stefan-batory-foundation-legal-expert-
group-reports/ (last visited 1 August 2020).
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an obvious contradiction between the court’s fact
finding and the evidence gathered in the case, and the
judgment may not be set aside or amended by other
exceptional measures of appeal.21 The extraordinary
appeal can be lodged exclusively by the Prosecutor Gen-
eral, the Ombudsman and few other public authorities
such as the Child’s Ombudsman and the President of
the Office of Competition and Consumer Protection.
The aim of the measure is to correct the defects of the
final judgments that cannot be modified by cassation or
reopening of proceedings. However, quashing a contes-
ted judgment is possible only if a gross violation of law
or obvious contradiction between the court’s fact
finding and the evidence gathered in the case has occur-
red. Therefore, the extraordinary complaint resembles
cassation having two distinguishable features. First, it
offers limited opportunity to question errors of law that
occurred during the proceedings. And, secondly, it can
be used to question the establishment of facts in the
case, which is not allowed in cassation proceedings.
Certainly, not all discussed measures might be used in
cases of convicted persons claiming their innocence.
Some of the grounds allowing the lodging of a cassation
or a motion for reopening of procedure, because of their
nature, exclude such a possibility. If the right to claim
innocence is understood very broadly, as alleging any
type of error affecting final conviction, it is obvious that
both cassation and reopening of proceedings, as well as
extraordinary appeal may be used as such. If, however,
that right is understood as an ability to put into question
the facts of the case established in the ruling, then the
possibilities are more limited. Apart from cassation that
allows alleging the incorrect evaluation of evidence and
the extraordinary complaint that can be lodged in cases
where an obvious contradiction between the court’s fact
finding and the evidence gathered in the case occurred,
the convict may refer only to propter nova and propter
falsa grounds for reopening of the proceedings.22 These
measures allow the case to be reopened because of newly
discovered circumstances after conviction that indicate
that it was wrongful.
The article focuses exclusively on the latter issue and
has been divided into five chapters. We begin with the
case study of Komenda’s successful innocence claim,
which serves as a good example of reopening a case and
acquitting the convict immediately. It also reveals some
of the reasons that commonly lie behind wrongful con-
victions. The next chapter discusses how the innocence
claim grounds are regulated in the Polish criminal
procedure and how they are understood in judicial prac-
tice. It also brings the presentation of the judicial pro-
ceedings concerning the revision of the case. The fourth
chapter focuses on the use of the innocence claim in
practice. Despite the limited access to information, we
attempt to explain the scattered statistical data and show
the tendencies in application for revision of a case. It
also presents the efforts of the Polish Ombudsman and
21. Art. 89 (1) of the Act of 8 December 2017 on Supreme Court.
22. Art. 540 § 1 (1-2) CCP.
NGOs to raise public awareness in that field. The final
conclusions address the main challenges that the Polish
system faces concerning innocence claims and indicates
the direction in which the system should go.
2 The Komenda Case23
On the morning of New Year’s Day 1997 in the back-
yard of a house in a small village, Miłoszyce, in the
southwestern part of Poland, the body of a 15-year-old
girl Małgosia Kwiatkowska was found. The girl had
died of cold and loss of blood resulting from a brutal
rape committed just before she was left to die. The
investigation established that she had been celebrating
New Year’s Eve in the town’s disco with her friends and
had left the club, appearing heavily drunk, with three
unknown men. At the crime scene the evidence, which
was carefully gathered, included bite marks on the vic-
tim’s body and hair and DNA samples of the offenders,
and although many witnesses were questioned, the per-
petrators were not found, and the case was soon closed
as unsolved.
It was not until four years later that the police unexpect-
edly arrested Tomasz Komenda, a young man with a
clear criminal record, identified as the alleged perpetra-
tor on the basis of facial recognition from a police sketch
shown in a TV program. During the trial Tomasz
Komenda denied his guilt and provided an alibi from
his twelve friends with whom he claimed to spend that
New Year’s Eve in the city remaining 24 kilometres
away from the crime scene. The main evidence invoked
against Komenda was the expert’s opinion on bite mark
evidence and DNA, the testimony of the witness who
recognised him from a sketch and his own confession
made just after his arrest during police questioning. He
was found guilty by the District Court in Wrocław in
2003, a judgment that was subsequently sustained by
the Wrocław Court of Appeal, and was sentenced to 25
years of imprisonment. The cassation in his case was
rejected by the Supreme Court in 2005 as obviously
unjustified, and the case remained closed for many
years.
Since the first informal interrogation on the night of his
arrest, later described by Komenda as brutally enforced
on him through threats and violence, he never admitted
that he raped and killed the victim. Neither did he do so
during subsequent interrogations by the prosecutor nor
23. The description of the case is based on available court decisions and
articles from the newspapers by K. Nowakowska, ‘Zbrodnia miłoszycka
wciąż czeka na wyjaśnienie. Śledczy popełniają te same błędy, które
doprowadziły do niesłusznego skazania Tomasza Komendy’, Gazeta
Prawna, 11 August 2019, https://prawo.gazetaprawna.pl/artykuly/
1425686,zbrodnia-miloszycka-tomasz-komenda-kto-zabil-malgorzate-
k.html (last visited 1 August 2020) and the interview with Komenda’s
lawyer – Zbigniew Ćwiąkalski in Rzeczpospolita newspaper on
29 July 2019, www.rp.pl/W-sadzie-i-urzedzie/190729360-Zbigniew-
Cwiakalski-o-procesie-o-odszkodowanie-i-zadoscuczynienie-dla-
Tomasza-Komendy---wywiad.html (last visited 1 August 2020). See
also non-fiction book by G. Głuszak, 25 lat niewinności. Historia
Tomasza Komendy (2018).
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when testifying at the trial. Even during the eighteen
long years that he had spent in prison, severely maltrea-
ted and humiliated as a child rapist and murderer, he
always claimed that he was not guilty, which even cost
him a chance to be released on parole.
Throughout these long years in isolation Komenda was
receiving continuous support from his family, seeking
help from various institutions to exonerate him. But his
situation would probably not have changed if it had not
been for the curiosity of one police officer that got him
interested in the old town’s case. Digging through the
case file and asking questions, the officer became con-
vinced that an innocent was serving a sentence for the
crime. In 2017 he identified Ireneusz M., a convicted
rapist, as the potential perpetrator. The new suspect had
not only been present on the tragic night in the disco in
Miłoszyce but had also parked his bicycle in the same
backyard where the rape took place. Moreover, when
questioned back in 1997 as a witness he admitted that he
had known the victim and described in detail the red
socks that she was wearing that no one else could know
except one of the rapists because the socks were well
hidden under her black stockings. The prosecution
decided to reopen the closed investigation into the two
unknown perpetrators of the old crime. The new DNA
tests confirmed that the semen found on the victim’s
clothes belonged to Ireneusz M. He was immediately
arrested and charged.
At that point the motion to reopen the criminal pro-
ceedings in favour of Tomasz Komenda was lodged
with the Supreme Court by the prosecutor, on the basis
of new facts and evidence showing that he did not com-
mit the offence of which he was found guilty. The pros-
ecution submitted a long list of evidence in support of
the motion. A new, very complex, expert opinion using
advanced techniques was filed, confirming that the
blood samples and, in particular, the bite marks found
on the victim’s body did not belong to Tomasz Komen-
da. Moreover, it was argued that some key witnesses
became unreliable in the light of new interrogations and
identification of Ireneusz M. as a new suspect. The
prosecution not only sought the reopening of the case
but also demanded the immediate acquittal of Tomasz
Komenda.
The Supreme Court of Poland held the hearing on the
16 May 2018 and issued the judgment.24 The Court has
focused in its ruling on new opinions that definitely
excluded Tomasz Komenda as a perpetrator. The deci-
sion was made in accordance with the prosecutor’s
request, and Komenda was immediately acquitted. He
left the courtroom as a free man surrounded by family
and friends.
Currently, Ireneusz M., together with a second suspect,
Norbert B., both arrested in 2018, are standing trial
under charges of rape and murder of Małgosia. They
both pleaded not guilty and claim that they will share
24. Supreme Court Judgment of 16 May 2018, V KO 26/18, available in
Polish at www.sn.pl/sites/orzecznictwo/orzeczenia3/v%20ko%2026
-18-1.pdf (last visited 1 August 2020).
Komenda’s fate of wrongful convict. The Regional
Prosecution Office in Łódź conducts an independent
investigation for possible abuse of power and negligence
of those engaged in the original investigation leading to
Komenda’s accusation. There are rumours that the need
to identify the perpetrator at all costs and personal
revenge might have contributed to many mistakes in
that case. Tomasz Komenda currently lives in Wrocław
with his family and is awaiting a decision on the com-
pensation for the wrongful conviction. His lawyer filed
the motion seeking compensation of 19 million PLN
(about 4 million EUR) – one million PLN for every year
of Komenda’s detention.
3 Procedure for Reopening
Criminal Proceedings Based
on the Innocence Claims
The exoneration of Tomasz Komenda was sought for on
the basis of new facts and evidence found after his case
became final. But, as mentioned earlier, there are two
grounds in the Polish system that can be used to reopen
the case on the basis of the so-called innocence claim.
Both are understood in the literature25 and case law26 as
extraordinary measures that should be employed only
exceptionally so as not to become a threat to the stability
of the court’s rulings. They will now be described in
turn.
The first basis of the innocence claim, set in accordance
with the structure of the Code, is the propter falsa that
allows for reopening of the case if a crime has been com-
mitted in connection with those proceedings when there
are reasonable grounds to believe that this might have
affected the ruling.27 The commitment of a criminal
offence that could have impacted the ruling has to be, as
a rule, confirmed in a separate judgment.28 This forces
the petitioner to report the crime and to obtain the rele-
vant judgment first. If there is no conviction for the
alleged offence, but there were no legal obstacles to ini-
tiate such proceedings, the motion to reopen the case
will not be accepted even if, e.g., alongside the motion
the written statement has been submitted in which the
person admits providing false testimony in proceedings
that are about to be reopened.29 She must be first
assumed as a perpetrator of perjury in separate criminal
proceedings, and only thereafter can the motion to
reopen the case successfully proceed.30
25. S. Zabłocki, in R.A. Stefański and S. Zabłocki (eds.), Kodeks postępowa-
nia karnego. Komentarz, vol. III (2004), at 649.
26. Resolution of the Supreme Court of 19.02.2014, III KO 104/14, LEX nr
1656221.
27. Art. 540 § 1 (1) CCP.
28. Art. 541 § 1 CCP.
29. Resolution of the Court of Appeals in Cracow of 6.10.2010, II AKo
116/10, LEX nr 783355.
30. Resolution of the Supreme Court of 30.10.2015, IV KO 81/14, LEX nr
2009511.
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Despite the regulation that the pre-existing conviction is
a necessary condition to reopen the case upon a propter
falsa ground, it is also possible to seek the review even if
the case did not reach the final decision of that kind but
was dismissed for the reasons precluding the conviction
carefully set forth by law.31 That means that non-con-
viction decisions might also be of relevance. However,
the materials gathered in the terminated case have to
confirm that a criminal offence has been committed or
should at least mention circumstances that substantiate
its commitment.32 This is regardless of whether the case
has been dismissed by the prosecutor during investiga-
tion or later in the course of proceedings by the court.
For instance, the proceedings can be reopened if the
court discontinues the proceedings owing to the death
of the defendant or because the prosecution became
impossible because of the expiration of the statute limi-
tations, if it was earlier established that the crime has
been committed. If such a fact was not established in
pre-existing ruling, it does not deprive the convicted
person of a right to apply for reopening of proceedings.
Although in some decisions the Supreme Court has
taken the view that the court competent to reopen the
proceedings was not empowered to hear the evidence
and to establish the commission of an offence that might
have affected the case in question,33 recently the Crim-
inal Chamber of the Supreme Court ruled that in cases
where there is no possibility of obtaining a prior judicial
decision confirming the fact that the offence has been
committed, the applicant has to substantiate that fact in
the motion for reopening of the proceedings, and the
role of the court is to verify the circumstances of the
case.34
The role of the court in reopening proceedings, apart
from possible fact finding concerning the commission of
an offence, is to verify whether the offence impacted the
decision that is sought to be quashed. It is hard to define
how such an impact should be measured, especially
since the law provides in very vague terms that it is
enough that ‘an offence could have influenced the rul-
ing’. Taking the example of perjury again, if the false
testimony was not crucial in securing conviction, since
the other available evidence in that case was considered
sufficient to prove that the convict who now seeks the
revision was guilty anyway, then the reopening of pro-
31. Among the reasons that this provision refers to are the death of the
defendant, the expiration of the statute of limitations or lack of juris-
diction of Polish courts (see Art. 17 § 1 (3)-(11) CCP). In such cases, the
decision to dismiss criminal proceedings issued on these grounds by the
competent authority is considered to be sufficient to allow reopening of
criminal proceedings in lieu of the judgment convicting the perpetrator.
The reopening of proceedings is also allowed if the proceedings regard-
ing the commitment of the crime have been suspended (Art. 22 CCP).
See more on the reasons to dismiss a case in the Polish criminal process
Jasiński and Kremens, above n. 13, at 234-5.
32. Resolution of the Supreme Court of 5.12.2012, III KO 28/12, OSNKW
2013/1/10.
33. Resolution of the Supreme Court of 30.10.2015, IV KO 81/14, LEX nr
2009511.
34. Resolution of the Supreme Court of 26.05.2020, I KZP 12/19, OSNKW
2020/6/17.
ceedings will not be granted.35 But, on the other hand, it
is not relevant who has been established as a perpetrator
of the offence based on which the revision is sought
for.36 Therefore, it may be a witness who committed
perjury or the judge who accepted a bribe in return for a
certain ruling, as well as a third party that produced the
fake evidence.37 The only factor that will be taken under
consideration by the court will be the impact that this
offence could have had on the conviction of the petition-
er who claims his innocence.
The propter nova ground, a second basis for the inno-
cence claim available in Polish law, is understood as a
situation where after the ruling has been issued, new
facts or evidence have been uncovered.38 This can be
done only if new facts or evidence suggest that either
1. a convict has not committed an offence or the act that
has been committed did not constitute an offence or
was not subject to a penalty;
2. a defendant has been convicted for an offence carry-
ing a more severe penalty, or when circumstances
necessitating the application of the extraordinary mit-
igation of a penalty have not been taken into account,
or when circumstances resulting in an extraordinary
aggravation of a penalty have incorrectly been accept-
ed;
3. a court discontinued or conditionally discontinued
criminal proceedings, incorrectly assuming that the
defendant has committed the imputed offence.
The new facts or evidence should be unknown both to
the court and the party seeking reopening of proceed-
ings,39 and the novelty of the facts or sources has to be
substantiated in a party’s motion. The applicant is
obliged to indicate what new facts have been discovered
since her conviction or has to adduce new evidence. As
it is accepted that the presumption of innocence does
not apply in proceedings concerning reopening of crim-
inal cases, the burden of proof remains with the appli-
cant.40
The new evidence is understood as stemming from a
totally new source such as an unknown witness, newly
discovered real evidence, as well as from a source that
was known but that reveals new information, e.g. new
depositions of the witness who testified at the trial.
However, new evaluation of evidence collected in a case
or different interpretation of the substantive criminal
law provisions relevant for the ruling cannot be consid-
35. Resolution of the Supreme Court of 10.12.2007 r., II KO 65/06, LEX nr
354299.
36. Resolution of the Court of Appeals in Cracow of 6.02.2018, II AKz
38/18, LEX nr 2610645.
37. D. Świecki, in D. Świecki (ed.), Kodeks postępowania karnego. Komen-
tarz, vol. II (2018), at 666.
38. Art. 540 § 1 (2) CCP.
39. Until 2013 r. the discussed provision provided that new facts or evid-
ence should be unknown exclusively to the court. Amendment of that
provision is understood as a move towards strengthening the obligation
of the parties to reveal in a timely manner all relevant sources of infor-
mation they possess – see Świecki, above n. 37, at 668.
40. Ibid., at 670-1. See also Resolution of the Supreme Court of
18.10.2017, II KO 61/17, LEX nr 2382417.
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ered as a ground for reopening of the case.41 Even if the
criminal law provisions were obviously misapplied, that
should be corrected, if possible, by other measures.42 If
the motion for reopening of proceedings is backed by a
written witness statement, the role of the court is to
establish whether the revealed information brings into
question the correctness of the final judgment.43
The Supreme Court case law on the admissibility of a
private expert’s opinion backing motion for reopening
of the proceedings is inconsistent. The majority view is
that this can be the case, but only in exceptional circum-
stances. If the private opinion was drafted on the basis
of the same evidence as previously evaluated by the
expert witness officially appointed by the prosecutor or
court on the basis of Article 193 § 1 CCP, the opinion,
even if containing different conclusions, cannot be per-
ceived as new evidence. In such a case it is considered as
a prohibited alternative interpretation of existing evid-
ence.44 However, if the opinion relies on facts that were
not previously known or if a new scientific method was
applied by the expert to prepare the expertise it might
be qualified as a new fact allowing the proceedings to be
reopened, if other conditions are met.45
It is also required that new facts or evidence has to indi-
cate with high probability or near certainty that the final
ruling in a criminal case was erroneous and that after the
reopening of the case the convicted person will be
acquitted or proceedings discontinued.46 For instance,
the sole fact that the victim has testified in a different
case that he is now not sure about the details of the
offence was considered by the Supreme Court as new
evidence that is insufficient to justify the reopening of
proceedings.47
Both in cases of propter nova and propter falsa grounds,
the reopening of the proceedings is triggered only by the
party’s motion. Therefore, the motion can be lodged by
the convict or by the public prosecutor.48 There is also a
limited right to seek reopening of proceedings by the
aggrieved party (victim) acting as an auxiliary prosecu-
tor,49 which can be sought only on propter falsa grounds.
Interestingly, revision of the case is permissible not only
41. Świecki, above n. 37, at 668.
42. E.g. through the cassation lodged by the Ombudsman.
43. Resolution of the Supreme Court of 20.10.2016, V KO 60/16, LEX nr
2151453.
44. Resolution of the Supreme Court of 8.08.2018, II KO 27/18, LEX nr
2530704.
45. Świecki, above n. 37, at 669. See also: Resolution of the Supreme
Court of 16.05.2018, V KP 26/18, LEX nr 2515771.
46. Resolution of the Supreme Court of 8.10.2019, V KO 20/19, OSNKW
2020/3/9.
47. Resolution of the Supreme Court of 20.05.2005, IV KO 38/04, LEX nr
223189.
48. In the case of the motion filed by the prosecutor the reopening of pro-
ceedings can also be done to the disadvantage of the convict. One of
the interesting differences between the discussed grounds is that while
in the case of propter falsa the proceedings can be reopened both in
favour of and to the disadvantage of the defendant, the new facts and
evidence can become a basis only for the reopening of proceedings to
her advantage.
49. See more on the roles that the aggrieved party can play in the course of
Polish criminal proceedings in Jasiński and Kremens, above n. 13, at
239-40.
in relation to living convicts alone. A motion can also be
lodged by the next of kin of a deceased convict in order
to clear her name. The proceedings can be reopened
even after the penalty has been executed, the record of
conviction has been erased or the person has been par-
doned.
In all cases where the motion is submitted by partici-
pants other than the public prosecutor, it has to be
drafted and signed by the counsel50 that aims to bring
the expected quality to this complicated document and
to prevent hasty applications. The applicant has a right
to legal aid on proving that she is unable to bear the
costs of hiring the counsel to draft the motion.51 How-
ever, the appointed counsel is not obliged to submit a
motion, but, if the careful analysis of the case leads to
the conclusion that there are no relevant grounds to
reopen the proceedings, the counsel must instead sub-
mit the legal opinion stating the reasons against filing
such a motion.52 The motion for reopening of the pro-
ceedings can be withdrawn. However, if the public
prosecutor lodged a motion in favour of the convict, the
withdrawal has to be approved by that person.
The proceedings for reopening of a case are fully judi-
cial. The court sits in a panel of three professional
judges. The hearing is held either before the Regional
Court, if the final judgment was issued by the District
Court; before the Court of Appeals, if the final judg-
ment was issued by the Regional Court; or before the
Supreme Court, if the final judgment was issued by the
Court of Appeals or the Supreme Court.53 To reopen
the case, it is not necessary to exhaust all appellate
measures available in Polish law. As a result, even judg-
ments that were not appealed are formally eligible for
the reopening procedure.
After submitting the motion, the president of the court
verifies it formally. If the formal requirements are not
satisfied, the motion will be returned to the applicant,
who will be asked to supplement it within 7 days. If the
motion is not drafted and signed by the counsel, the
applicant will be informed about the necessity to correct
that error. Exceptionally, if at the same time the motion
is clearly groundless, a single judge may simply refuse to
proceed with the case, which will be usually done if the
motion refers to circumstances that were already ana-
lysed in the reopening proceedings.54 It is argued in the
literature that this should also apply to cases in which
the grounds for reopening of proceedings mentioned in
the motion fall outside of the statutory catalogue, where
the applicant relies on circumstances irrelevant from the
point of view of legal grounds for reopening of a case, as
well as in cases where the grounds for reopening of a
case were not mentioned in the motion at all.55 The
50. Art. 545 § 2 CCP.
51. Art. 78 CCP.
52. Art. 84 § 3 CCP.
53. See on the system of Polish courts in D. de Vocht, ‘Poland’, in E. Cape,
Z. Namoradze, R. Smith & T. Spronken (eds.), Effective Criminal
Defence in Europe (2010), at 427.
54. Art. 545 § 3 CCP.
55. Świecki, above n. 37, at 706-7.
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decision refusing to proceed with the motion is subject
to interlocutory appeal.
If the motion is considered impermissible, as, for
instance, based on grounds other than those allowing
the reopening of proceedings, or submitted by a person
not entitled to do so, it will be rejected.56 Only those
motions accepted as formally correct and permissible
will be decided on their merits.
The hearing on reopening of proceedings is held in
camera and without the presence of the parties,
although this may be decided otherwise by the court
that hears the case. The court is entitled to conduct
investigation into the facts of the case (czynności sprawd-
zające).57 It can be done by the court en banc, by one of
the judges of the panel or even by another court on
request. Conduct of investigation is an integral part of
the reopening proceedings. Unlike in some other juris-
dictions, e.g. France, the relevant legal provisions in
Poland do not separate the investigative and adjudica-
tive stages of this kind of proceedings. Conducting
investigation is perceived as particularly useful in those
cases where there is a need to verify new facts.58 The
right to investigate the facts of the case is understood as
empowering the court either to take evidence on a regu-
lar basis according to the rules applicable at trial, e.g.
taking testimony from witnesses or expert witnesses and
inspecting documents or to verify available sources
without the necessity to apply all strict evidentiary rules.
The first option should be applied by courts where the
case is to be reopened and should result in immediate
acquittal (as in the Komenda case) or discontinuation of
proceedings. The second option should be used if the
court decides exclusively on reopening the case and
leaves the decision on the merits to the competent crim-
inal court. Regardless of the evidentiary rules adopted,
the parties are entitled to participate in investigative
actions undertaken by the court.
If the motion proves that the legal conditions for
reopening of proceedings are met, the court issues a
decision quashing the final judgment and remands the
case for retrial. The decision is final and cannot be chal-
lenged.59 If the motion was filed to the advantage of the
convict, during the retrial her situation cannot be made
worse. In exceptional cases the court may decide to
reopen the proceedings and immediately acquit the con-
vict if new facts or evidence indicates that the ruling is
obviously unfair.60 The court may also quash the final
judgment and dismiss the proceedings if there are
grounds for taking such a decision. The immediate
acquittals and dismissals are reviewable unless the deci-
sion was issued by the Supreme Court. If, after the
hearing, the motion is not considered justified, it is dis-
56. The rejection can be challenged in the court of a higher level, except
when the rejection was decided in the proceedings before the Supreme
Court; in such a case, the interlocutory appeal is heard by the other
panel of the Supreme Court judges.
57. Art. 546 CCP.
58. Świecki, above n. 37, at 706-7.
59. Art. 547 § 2 CCP.
60. Art. 547 § 3 CCP.
missed by the court, and this decision may be subjected
to interlocutory appeal.61 The rulings issued in reopen-
ing proceedings are served on the parties (if delivered in
camera) or delivered orally during the hearing accessible
to the public. Selected anonymised decisions are also
accessible through the websites of each court.
If the case has been reopened to the advantage of the
convicted person, the court is obliged to verify whether
it is necessary to also reopen proceedings to the advant-
age of other individuals convicted in the quashed judg-
ment, since the revealed circumstances might also refer
to them. In such a case the court also rules in favour of
every convicted person, even if they did not apply for it.
4 Right to Claim Innocence in
Practice
The scant Polish legal scholarship on the subject of
wrongful convictions and, more generally, of reopening
of criminal proceedings on various grounds, is reflected
by the insignificant impact of these topics on public
debate. For instance, when compared with the attention
that the Innocence Project initiative62 receives world-
wide, the recognition of its Polish branch is much weak-
er. The Innocence Clinic (Klinika Niewinność),63 being a
part of the European Innocence Network,64 works under
the auspices of the Helsinki Foundation of Human
Rights in Poland as a part of the University of Warsaw
curriculum of the Faculty of Law and Administration.
It engages approximately ten to fifteen young law stu-
dents yearly, who, under the supervision of the experi-
enced academic and practitioner Maria Ejchart-Dubois,
verify the case files of those who claim innocence. With
limited funds, weak institutional support and no large-
scale engagement of activists, it seems as barely covering
the needs of the system.
The furthest-reaching efforts to promote the need to
identify the reasons for wrongful convictions and to
build an effective mechanism to address the issue have
been undertaken in the Office of the Polish Ombuds-
man – Adam Bodnar. The idea of creating the ‘Inno-
cence Commission’ has been proposed by the Ombuds-
man in his statement presented as a reaction to the
Komenda case, even before the Supreme Court ruled on
the issue.65 The Commission, as proposed by the
Ombudsman, could be based on similar mechanisms as
known from the UK and US examples, upon the princi-
61. Art. 547 § 1 CCP. However, the interlocutory appeal cannot be lodged
against the dismissals issued by the court of appeal or Supreme Court,
which are considered final.
62. www.innocenceproject.org (last visited 1 August 2020).
63. www.hfhr.pl/klinika-niewinnosc-nowa-edycja/ (last visited 1 August
2020).
64. https://innocencenetwork.org (last visited 1 August 2020).
65. ‘Statement of the Ombudsman Adam Bodnar’, 30 March 2018,
www.rpo.gov.pl/sites/default/files/Oświadczenie%20RPO%20Adama
%20Bodnara%20ws.%20Tomasza%20Komendy%2030.03.2018.pdf
(last visited 1 August 2020).
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ple of full independence from all state authorities and
would be composed of judges, prosecutors, private law-
yers, police officers and members of NGOs providing
help for vulnerable victims. In the proposal, the Com-
mission is designed to address only those cases where
the convict is still alive, focusing only on cases concern-
ing the most severe crimes, i.e. felonies, and should hear
cases with the aim of only exonerating the convict and
not changing or reducing the penalty. The decisions of
the Commission should be only of an advisory character
and should not replace the existing mechanisms of
reopening the criminal proceedings, leaving the final
decision to the court of law.
To promote his proposal, in 2019 and 2020 the
Ombudsman organised four seminars with the aim of
commencing a public debate on the creation of the
national commission, gathering academics, practitioners
and activists that supported the idea.66 The public out-
rage that Tomasz Komenda’s and some other cases
described by the media have generated67 has given hope
for a change. Unfortunately, despite these efforts, no
legislative initiative to modify the procedures allowing
one to claim innocence after the final conviction has
appeared so far.
The returning question concerns the number of
successful requests to reopen criminal proceedings
based, in particular, on new facts and evidence and the
real scale of wrongful convictions in the Polish legal
system. This could lead to identifying the reasons for
that phenomenon and would allow the undertaking of
action to eliminate mechanisms causing these traumatic
consequences to its victims. As noted previously, no
large-scale empirical studies aiming at estimating the
efficiency of remedies available to those that believe had
been wrongfully convicted have been conducted in
Poland to date. In a few works the focus remained on
the reasons of wrongful convictions, which allowed the
66. See the coverage of the first conference held on 21 September 2019,
www.rpo.gov.pl/pl/content/niesluszne-skazania-w-polsce-seminarium-
w-biurze-rpo (last visited 1 August 2020).
67. The recent decision to reopen criminal proceedings against Arkadiusz
Kraska (Supreme Court Judgment of 8 October 2019, V KO 20/19,
OSNKW 2020/3/9) also received considerable attention. The convict
was charged with two counts of murder and sentenced to life-imprison-
ment in 2001. This case was particularly interesting since the motion to
reopen criminal proceedings was lodged with the Supreme Court by the
Regional Prosecutor’s Office in Szczecin and quickly withdrawn upon
the order received from the National Prosecution Office, which gave a
floor to discussion on the independence within the prosecution service.
The convict, soon before being released on parole, did not accept the
withdrawal, forcing the Supreme Court to eventually hear his case. As a
result, the Supreme Court reopened the proceedings but, unlike what
happened to Komenda, did not decide to immediately exonerate the
accused but to order a new trial, which is currently being conducted
before the Regional Court in Szczecin. The Supreme Court has argued
that new facts have proved that the improper investigative measures
were employed at an early stage of the criminal investigation, including
forgery of the records of questioning of two police officers and the lack
of use of recordings from surveillance cameras at the crime scene,
which could exclude Kraska as the suspect. The Court has also raised
doubts regarding the credibility of two anonymous witnesses accusing
Kraska. The details of the case have been covered in a book authored
by E. Ornacka, Wrobiony w dożywocie. Sprawa Arkadiusza Kraski
(2019).
gathering of some scattered data.68 The most compre-
hensive study in this regard has concerned the case-file
analysis of 119 cases within the jurisdiction of the Court
of Appeal in Poznań, in which the wrongful conviction
had been confirmed through cassation and reopening of
criminal proceedings.69 This allowed the researchers to
identify that in the majority of cases the wrongful con-
victions were not related to shortcomings in taking evid-
ence but most frequently resulted from the incompe-
tence of lawyers participating in the process that led to
mistakes and miscarriages of justice.70
The appraisal of the scale of the problem may be based
on the number of compensation awards to persons iden-
tified as being wrongfully convicted. From 2010 to 2018
the courts awarded compensation to an average of six-
teen former convicts yearly.71 However, it is not possi-
ble to draw far-reaching conclusions from this data. It
only allows to determine the number of wrongful con-
victions officially identified as such in accordance with
the legal definition.72 Therefore, on the one hand, the
numbers include compensations that were awarded as a
result of all available measures aimed at changing the
final judgment and, moreover, they most likely also
include cases in which the conviction was not ques-
tioned but the penalty was assessed as disproportionate-
ly harsh, which may also lead to awarding compensa-
tion. On the other hand, these statistics do not include
cases that could be interpreted as wrongful convictions
in which the convict after the final judgment did not
decide to lodge any extraordinary measure to quash it or
filed it but did not succeed in convincing the court that
such a judgment should be changed, as well as situations
where the convicted person after her exoneration did
not claim compensation at all. As a result, this data
should be read with caution regarding its accuracy as to
the real scale of the issue.
To identify the number of criminal proceedings reop-
ened on the grounds that concern the innocence claim,
the courts hearing cases on requests to reopen criminal
proceedings73 were addressed to provide the relevant
data. Almost all of them were reluctant to provide pre-
cise information, arguing that obtaining detailed data
would be impossible in view of the limited resources.
68. See Widacki and Dudzińska, above n. 3, at 64 (the study had limited
coverage and was based on the questionnaire circulated among thirty
lawyers from Warsaw Bar in Poland) and Mazur, above n. 3, at 9 (the
study has also been conducted in the form of a questionnaire adminis-
tered to 189 prosecutors and 450 police officers).
69. Chojniak and Wiśniewski, above n. 1.
70. Ibid., at 73-7.
71. The estimation based on the data received from the Ministry of Justice
on 4 September 2019 upon the access to public information request
(DSF-II.082.249.2019); on file with authors. Note that the number of
decisions in the given period was not equal each year and ranged from
5 to 33 decisions.
72. Art. 552 § 1 CCP provides that wrongful conviction should be under-
stood as a conviction that was quashed in the course of one of the
extraordinary procedures (cassation, reopening of criminal proceedings
or extraordinary complaint), and, in consequence, the convicted person
was acquitted or sentenced to a more lenient penalty than the one that
had already been executed.
73. This means all forty-five Regional Courts and all eleven Appellate
Courts as well as the Supreme Court.
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Therefore, the acquired data should be considered as
neither providing full data nor giving an exhaustive
answer to all questions. Nevertheless, they allow some
conclusions to be reached.
Figure 1 shows the number of requests filed with Polish
courts74 demanding reopening of criminal proceedings
concerning all grounds and not only those based on the
propter nova or propter falsa claims. In relation to that, in
2018 the Polish criminal courts decided in 318.168
cases, out of which the conviction was passed in 87% of
cases (277.974 convictions),75 these numbers can be con-
sidered very low. In just about 0.4% of cases the con-
victs were seeking the possibility to reopen criminal pro-
ceedings.
The data received from twenty-five Regional Courts
and six Courts of Appeal76 also allowed for estimation of
the success rates of motions lodged with courts. In the
74. The number does not include data from the Supreme Court, which
refused to provide the exact number of motions concerning reopening
of criminal proceedings. It can be estimated on the basis of the available
statistical data concerning all types of motions that are filed with the
Supreme Court each year that approximately 200-300 motions of that
kind may be lodged. See Informacja o działalności Sądu Najwyższego
w roku 2018 and Informacja o działalności Izby Dyscyplinarnej Sądu
Najwyższego w roku 2018, Warszawa 2019, www.sn.pl/
osadzienajwyzszym/Dzialalnosc_SN/Informacja%20o%20dzialalnosci
%20SN%20i%20ID%20SN%202018.cleaned.pdf (last visited 1 Aug-
ust 2020), at 181.
75. Official statistics of National Prosecution Office for 2018, at 6,
pk.gov.pl/wp-content/uploads/2019/04/PG_P1K.pdfhttps://pk.gov.pl/
wp-content/uploads/2019/04/PG_P1K.pdf (last visited 1 Aug-
ust 2020).
76. The rest of the courts provide the residual data or did not provide them
at all.
case of Regional Courts only 15% of all submitted
motions resulted in reopening of criminal proceedings.77
And in the case of Courts of Appeal it was just 10%.
The very low acceptance of requests to reopen criminal
proceedings can be partially justified by the fact that
many of the motions are prepared by convicts in person
and not by the lawyer, which prevents the motion being
decided on its merits. More detailed insight into the
nature of decisions that are reached by courts can be
shown on the example of data provided by the Regional
Court of Opole, although it must be remembered that
the size of the court, regionalisms and local practices
probably make this data unrepresentative for the whole
country. In the period 2015 to 2018 the Regional Court
of Opole has received 167 motions to reopen the crim-
inal proceedings on various grounds (see Figure 2).
Reopening of the proceedings took place in fifty-seven
cases (35%). This predominantly concerned remanding
the case for retrial (fifty-three cases), and only rarely
after reopening was the convict immediately acquitted
(1) or the case dismissed (3). In another twenty-eight
cases (17%) the case was heard on its merits but dis-
missed. In forty-nine cases (30%) there was a refusal to
proceed with the motion, and in eight cases the motion
was rejected (5%). The remaining twenty-two cases
(13%) were decided otherwise, which means that, e.g.,
the motion was filed with the wrong court and the case
77. In some cases, the success rate is substantially lower than the average.
For instance, in the Regional Court in Tarnobrzeg of all the eighty-three
motions received between 2015 and 2018 only in one case did the
court decide to reopen the proceedings. It is hard to judge this phenom-
enon.
Figure 1 Number of requests to reopen criminal proceedings lodged with Polish Courts between 2015 and 2018.
Figure 2 Type of decisions issued in 2015-2018 in Regional Court of Opole in response to motions to reopen proceedings.
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had to be transferred to the one having jurisdiction over
the case.
The courts were also asked to provide the grounds
invoked by petitioners in their motions. Only one court
agreed to provide such data, which shows how often the
innocence claims become the basis of decisions for
reopening criminal proceedings. The information that
follows must be treated with a great deal of caution as to
its accuracy and representativeness for the whole coun-
try since it is based on data received from only one court
and only reveals the grounds for the decisions decided
on merits. In the period from 2015 to 2018 the Regional
Court of Olsztyn decided altogether on reopening crim-
inal proceedings in 177 cases. In only forty-two cases
was the motion decided on merits, and of those only in
fifteen cases did the court decide to reopen the proceed-
ings.
Figure 3 shows that of forty-two cases decided on mer-
its, new facts or evidence formed almost half of the
invoked grounds (twenty cases), while attempts to
reopen the proceedings based on propter falsa grounds
are almost non-existent (one case in 2016 – the reopen-
ing was rejected anyway). 50% of cases were sought to
be reopened on other grounds.78 This shows how diffi-
cult it is to seek the reopening under a propter falsa argu-
ment. It is most likely caused by the necessity to obtain
the judgment establishing the commitment of a crime
being a prerequisite to demand the reopening of the
proceedings.
5 Conclusions
Finding a fair balance between legal certainty and the
need to eliminate errors of justice is an extremely diffi-
cult task. Multiplication of verification procedures,
especially those allowing overturning of the final convic-
tion is not a proper solution. Nonetheless, various juris-
dictions, of different origins and legal traditions, allow
reopening of a case under the extraordinary circum-
78. See Chapter 1, explaining other grounds than propter nova and propter
falsa as a basis for reopening proceedings that remain outside of the
scope of what can be considered as ‘innocence claim’.
stances. The main question is how and by whom it can
be done.
For the applicant the main issue is whether the proce-
dure is accessible and whether it gives a chance of elimi-
nating most common errors of justice resulting in
wrongful convictions. Polish law is partly deficient from
that perspective. On the one hand, the case law empha-
sises the stability of judgments and the extraordinary
character of the procedure to reopen criminal proceed-
ings. That might be a side effect of the reopening proce-
dure having exclusively judicial character, not allowing
alternative non-judicial perspectives in the process of
revising accuracy of the final judgment. However, it can
be expected that the creation of the Innocence Commis-
sion may change this situation. The recent Ombuds-
man’s proposal, in which the Commission is composed
of people with various backgrounds, would allow the
inclusion of extrajudicial perspective and make it possi-
ble to investigate cases that could hardly be successful in
regular judicial proceedings. Yet the lack of power to
reopen the proceedings by the Commission itself, might
hold back the system from being as accessible as expec-
ted. The opinion of the Commission might not be
enough to overcome the reluctance of the courts to
reopen criminal cases.
The low number of cases in which convicts claim inno-
cence seeking revision of judgments is also justified by
the lack of possibility under Polish law to question the
evaluation of evidence or the quality of expert witness’s
opinion in those proceedings. Even if there are reasona-
ble grounds to assume that errors took place and the
case should be reopened, the law does not provide for
such grounds. Only the availability of new facts or evid-
ence that had been previously unknown to the parties
and the court justifies the reopening of proceedings.
This significantly reduces the number of successful
applications.
The chances of successfully seeking reopening of the
case should also be considered limited owing to the
requirement of the judicial predetermination of an
offence as a necessary condition for successful propter
falsa claims. That formal requirement allows the courts
to dismiss the motions seeking revision of the conviction
based on that ground, without even analysing the merits
of the case.
Figure 3 Types of grounds on which the Regional Court of Olsztyn decided on merits in proceedings to reopen the case issued in
2015-2018.
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The regulation of the procedure for reopening of the
proceedings in Poland also seems to underestimate its
significance in preventing wrongful convictions. Con-
trary to cassation and extraordinary complaint, the
motions for reopening of proceedings are not registered
in a separate category in the court registry. They are
recorded jointly with various types of motions or com-
plaints submitted to the court (e.g. motion to disqualify
a judge from hearing a case, motion to appoint a differ-
ent court to hear a case). This indirectly implies that
motions for reopening of proceedings are perceived as
less important when compared with other extraordinary
measures questioning the finality of judgments.
Another reason for the low number of such cases might
be the considerably weak position of the petitioner dur-
ing the reopening proceedings. His or her role is highly
dependent on the court’s powers over the mode of pro-
ceedings, including the parties’ participation and publi-
city of the hearing. Moreover, the crucial issue of
whether and how the new facts and evidence attached to
the motion for reopening of the case should be verified
has been left to the discretion of the court acting in
reopening proceedings. That may also result in arbitrary
decisions, which are usually not subject to scrutiny,
unless issued by the Regional Court. Essentially, the
convict seeking revision of her case has no measures
available to her that would allow addressing criminal
justice authorities when the securing of evidence is
needed. Whereas the Komenda case proves that if it had
not been for the determination of one person involved in
the process, who started collecting new materials and
questioning witnesses, the convict would have never
been released. Therefore, allowing convicts to address
the Commission directly and giving the latter the right
to order gathering of additional evidence outside of the
existing criminal process seems to be a good solution.
This would give some hope for the enhancement of
accessibility of proceedings to those who are wrongfully
convicted.
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